Macroeconomic Fluctuations as Sources of Luck in CEO Compensation by Chiu, Hsin-Hui et al.
Chapman University
Chapman University Digital Commons
Business Faculty Articles and Research Business
12-28-2014
Macroeconomic Fluctuations as Sources of Luck in
CEO Compensation
Hsin-Hui Chiu
California State University, Northridge
Lars Oxelheim
Lund University
Clas Wihlborg
Chapman University, wihlborg@chapman.edu
Jianhua Zhang
University of Gothenburg
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/business_articles
Part of the Business Administration, Management, and Operations Commons, Corporate
Finance Commons, Macroeconomics Commons, and the Management Sciences and Quantitative
Methods Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Business at Chapman University Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Business Faculty Articles and Research by an authorized administrator of Chapman University Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
laughtin@chapman.edu.
Recommended Citation
Chiu, H.-H., Oxelheim, L., Wihlborg, C., & Zhang, J. (2016). Macroeconomic fluctuations as sources of luck in CEO compensation.
Journal of Business Ethics, 136(2), 371–384. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-014-2520-1
Macroeconomic Fluctuations as Sources of Luck in CEO Compensation
Comments
This is a pre-copy-editing, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in Journal of Business
Ethics, volume 136, issue 2, in 2016 following peer review. The final publication is available at Springer via
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10551-014-2520-1 and may differ from the version presented here.
Copyright
Springer
This article is available at Chapman University Digital Commons: http://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/business_articles/56
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1663896 
1 
 
 
 
 
Macroeconomic Fluctuations as Sources of Luck in CEO Compensation 
 
 
 
Hsin-Hui Chiu 
California State University Northridge 
hsinhui.chiu@csun.edu 
 
Lars Oxelheim 
Lund University and Research Institute of Industrial Economics 
lars.oxelheim@fek.lu.se 
 
Clas Wihlborg 
Chapman University 
wihlborg@chapman.edu 
 
Jianhua Zhang 
University of Gothenburg 
jianhua.zhang@economics.gu.se 
 
 
November 10, 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Macroeconomic, Luck, Performance, CEO Compensation 
JEL Codes: G30, G32, J33, E00, L14, L16, M21, M52 
 
 
                                                 
 Hsin-Hui Chiu is an Assistant Professor of Finance at the College of Business and Economics at the California 
State University Northridge, 18111 Nordhoff Street, Northridge, CA 91330. Lars Oxelheim is a Professor at the 
Lund University and Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Lund, Sweden. Clas Wihlborg is a Professor of 
Finance at the Argyros School of Business and Economics, Chapman University, One University Drive, Orange, 
CA 92866.   Jianhua Zhang is a Senior Lecturer at the Center of Finance, School of Business, Economics, and 
Law at the University of Gothenburg. We would like to thank conference participants at the 2010 European 
Financial Management Association Annual Meetings, the 23rd Annual Australasian Finance and Banking 2010 
Conference, 2011 Academy of International Business Annual Meetings.  All errors remain our own. 
 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1663896 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Macroeconomic Fluctuations as Sources of Luck in CEO Compensation  
 
Abstract 
 
Macroeconomic fluctuations such as interest rate and exchange rate can be considered sources of good 
or bad “luck” for corporate performance. Incentive effects of performance-based compensation for 
management may be weakened or biased by macroeconomic influences depending on the ability of 
management to adjust for operations. We decompose the impacts on CEO compensation to 
distinguish between macroeconomic (anticipated and unanticipated) and “intrinsic” sources. Total 
CEO compensation is measured by including options awarded or options exercised. Both measures 
depend strongly on variations in macro factors but the time patterns differ. The macroeconomic 
factors increased total awarded compensation as much as 30 percent in one period and reduced 
awarded compensation 14 percent in another period. The effect on realized compensation ranges from 
positive 44 percent to negative 16 percent. The average annual absolute effect lies within the range of 
11 to 16 percent. 
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1. Introduction 
CEO compensation has increased sharply during the last few decades and has drawn significant 
attention from the general public, politicians and regulators in the US as well as in Europe; especially 
during the recent financial crisis.1 Although the level of compensation in Europe remains below that 
in the US, the level in most European countries have increased rapidly in the new millennium.2 
According to Fernandes et al. (2008), the difference between Europe and the US compensation can be 
explained to a large extent by performance-based component of executive compensation in the US 
compensation which seems to be associated with a higher risk premium. This observation implies that 
levels and forms of compensation are not independent.  
 In this paper we analyze the impact of macroeconomic fluctuations on CEO compensation in 
the US. We distinguish between anticipated and unanticipated fluctuations because incentive effects 
of macroeconomic fluctuations could depend on the degree to which they are anticipated as explained 
below. To our knowledge, US is the only country where data allows analysis for several dimensions 
of compensation for a long period but we are able to compare some results with a more limited study 
of CEO compensation in Sweden (Oxelheim et al, 2008) where variable compensation represents a 
much smaller share of total compensation. 
 Changes in macroeconomic conditions can be considered an important source of good or bad 
“luck” in corporate performance and in compensation based on performance. Although management 
lacks influence over macroeconomic conditions, compensation may be able to influence performance 
to the extent operations can be adjusted in response to contemporaneous or anticipated 
macroeconomic conditions. Thus, “purely” lucky or unlucky performance and compensation occurs in 
                                                 
1 In Gabaix and Landier (2008)  it is argued that the six fold  increase of CEO compensation in the US between 
1980‐2003  can be attributed  to  the  sixfold  increase of market  capitalization of  large  companies during  the 
same period. In a long time series analysis of CEO compensation Frydman and Saks (2010) show that prior to 
the 70s there was little dispersion across managers and low correlation between pay and firm size prior. After 
the 70s, incentive pay has grown significantly, correlation between pay and firm size has strengthened and pay 
dispersion across executives has widened.  
2 See, for example, Oxelheim and Randöy (2005). 
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response to macroeconomic events if management is unable to respond to these events for lack of 
anticipation or inability to adjust.  
 Analyzing the impact of luck on CEO compensation, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2000, 2001) 
define luck as performance beyond CEO’s control. They consider performance effects of fluctuations 
in oil prices in the energy sector, the impact of exchange rates in traded goods sectors and changes in 
performance from year to year around mean industry performance. Garvey and Milbourn (2006) use a 
market index and an industry index as proxies for stock price performance based on luck. In all cases 
the empirical results indicate that compensation depends strongly on luck. Benchmarking can be 
viewed as an attempt to adjust for luck. Aggarwal and Samwyck (1999) and more recently Bizjak, 
Lemmon, and Naveen (2008) document widespread use of benchmarking. 
 Accepting the premise from the contracting literature that optimal incentive contracts do not 
include rewards (penalties) for observable lucky (unlucky) performance, there is an additional 
difficulty associated with the measurement of luck or performance outside the control of 
management.3 As pointed out by Gopalan, Milbourn and Song (2009) the effect on performance of 
external shocks beyond management’s control can be influenced by management’s strategic choices 
as well as operational decisions in response to external shocks. If so, the incentives of management to 
take advantage of lucky external events and to dampen the effects of unlucky external events would 
be removed if compensation is not related to performance effects of lucky circumstances.  
 The implication of the above discussion is that the appropriate definition of lucky 
performance depends both on the nature of shocks and the technological, as well as managerial, 
ability to adjust strategy and operations to shocks within a certain time frame. The adjustment of 
strategy and operations can take the form of investment in flexibility (real options) in an environment 
characterized by high uncertainty about external shocks or adjustment may take the form of switching 
production and marketing efforts in response to anticipated and even current events such as exchange 
                                                 
3 The contracting literature indicates that optimal incentive contracts are achieved by means of some kind of 
benchmarking for “normal” performance and the linking of compensation to a performance measure reflecting 
skill and effort with as little noise as possible, Milgrom and Roberts (1992) and Rosen (1992 Contracts and the 
Market for Executives) review the contracting literature on incentive effects of compensation schemes.  
5 
 
rate changes. For instance, a restaurant business may be able to respond very quickly to lucky events 
by adding tables while a capital intensive firm may need years to adjust production capacity. In 
general, we would expect the service industry including the financial sector to have the technological 
capability to adjust operations rapidly to take advantage of macroeconomic fluctuations. In this case, 
skill and effort contribute to performance effects of short lived macroeconomic shocks.  
 In this paper we focus on the macroeconomic environment as a major external source of 
changes in CEO compensation as well as in corporate performance in the US during the period 1993-
2007. We distinguish between anticipated and unanticipated macroeconomic effects. If compensation 
responds to, for example, anticipated events but not to unanticipated events, managers have incentives 
to adjust operations in response to forecast macroeconomic developments.  
Three research questions will be investigated in this paper. First, we ask to what extent do 
macroeconomic fluctuations contribute to the level and variability of compensation. Second, we 
analyze whether there are substantial differences between compensation effects of anticipated and 
unanticipated macroeconomic fluctuations. Third, we ask whether differences between awarded and 
realized compensation reveal an ability of CEOs to exercise options with timing expertise with respect 
to macroeconomic events. 
 Macroeconomic developments during a period are captured by exchange rate changes, interest 
rates, and inflation rates. These macroeconomic price variables respond rapidly to underlying 
unobservable macroeconomic shocks and provide information about the extent of macroeconomic 
influences on compensation and performance.4  
 The dataset for CEO compensation in the US covering the period 1992-2008 includes salary, 
bonus, option awards and pension payments. We exclude data after 2008 due to years of financial 
crisis. Year 1992 shows that a very large share of executive compensation in the US is performance 
                                                 
4 Oxelheim and Wihlborg (2003, 2008) use these variables to  identify corporate exposure to macroeconomic 
uncertainty and to assess a firm’s “intrinsic” competitiveness. In Section 3 below we show that adding changes 
in GDP  to  changes  in  the macroeconomic  price  variables  does  not  add  information  about macroeconomic 
developments.  
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based. Cash compensation in the form of salary plus bonus constitutes 15-20 percent of total CEO 
compensation. The data is described in more details in the next section. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the data sources and stylized facts are 
presented. Section 3 presents estimations of pay-for-performance elasticities with respect to 
macroeconomic factors, industry factors and firm specific factors. Compensation is typically not 
linked in a simple way to one well-defined performance measure. Macroeconomic effects on 
compensation can occur through a number of channels depending on what aspects of performance 
affect salaries, bonus and other forms of CEO compensation. Then follows the section 4 in which we 
analyze and calculate the contributions of the macroeconomic factors to compensation and 
performance year by year. Since incentive effects of macroeconomic influences on compensation may 
depend on whether they are anticipated we make specific assumptions about expectations formation to 
illustrate the importance of identifying the contribution of luck correctly. The final section 5 provides 
concluding comments and policy implications. 
 
2. Data Sources and Stylized Facts 
Compensation data is obtained from Standard and Poor’s Execucomp through COMPUSTAT North 
America. The database covers about 3,000 companies, both active and inactive. Our sample consists 
of U.S. firms from 1992 to 2007 but the estimation period is limited to 1993-2007. Year 1992 data is 
used to calculate the rate of the return on compensation. All the variables are calculated in 1992 
values. 
 The following variables for CEOs are used in the empirical analysis below: 
1. TOTALCURR: Total current compensation which includes salary and bonus. 
2. TDC1: Total compensation as calculated under the 1992 reporting format. Total 
compensation is comprised of the following: Salary, Bonus, Other Annual, Total Value of Restricted 
Stock Granted, Total Value of Stock Options Granted (using Black-Scholes), Long-Term Incentive 
Payouts, and All Other Total (in thousands $). 
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3. TDC2: Total compensation as calculated under the 1992 reporting format. Total 
Compensation is comprised of the following: Salary, Bonus, Other Annual, Restricted Stock Grants, 
Long-Term Incentive Payments, All Other, and Value of Options Exercised (in thousands $). 
 The difference between TDC1 and TDC2 is that TDC1 includes the value of options at the 
time the options are awarded while TDC2 includes the value of options at the time they are exercised. 
Thus, TDC1 is what is usually known as compensation incentives while TDC2 represents realized 
payments to the executive. The cash payments on these options may differ substantially from options 
awarded. The correlation in cross-section between the two variables representing total compensation 
in 2007 is 0.58 while the correlation for our overall sample period is 0.47. From the point of view of 
risk management incentives the pattern of realized compensation should be of particular interest. 
In 2006 the FAS 123R changed the reporting requirements for executive compensation. 
Under the new reporting regime the cost of all employee stock options, as well as other equity-based 
compensation arrangements have to be reflected in the financial statements based on the estimated fair 
value of the awards (TOTAL_ALT1 and TOTAL_ALT2). However, we only have very short time 
series for each reporting firm of these two variables while TDC1 and TDC2 exist for the period before 
as well as after 2006.5 Since the correlations between TDC1 and TOTAL_ALT1, and between TDC2 
and TOTAL_ALT2 in cross-section for 2007 are as high as 0.99 and 0.81, we are comfortable using 
TDC1 and TDC2 as compensation measures.  
We begin by investigating the statistical properties of the three compensation series for 3,046 
firms in the dataset covering the period 1992-2007. The panel is unbalanced. After excluding some 
firms with incomplete data, there are 2,158 firms remaining in the compensation dataset. Table 1 
displays annual means and standard deviations for the levels (in thousands $) and index (year 
1992=100) of TOTALCURR, TDC1 and TDC2 for each year.  
 
(Insert Table 1 here) 
                                                 
5 TOTAL_ALT1 substitutes for TDC1 except that stock and option awards are valued using the grant date fair 
value of the award instead of the amount charged to the income statement under FAS 123R. TOTAL_ALT2 
substitutes for TDC2 except that stock and option awards are valued using the value realized from option 
exercise or stock vesting instead of the amount charged to the income statement under FAS 123R.  
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Table 1 shows that the variations across firms are larger each year in TDC1 than in 
TOTALCURR as one would expect in the US where variable compensation such as options granted 
constitute a large share of total compensation. The variations across firms are even larger in TDC2.  
 The peaks for TDC1 and TDC2 appear to occur at approximately the same time. Stock market 
peaked in 1999 and 2007. TDC1 including awarded incentives had its highest peak in 2000, the year 
after the peak in the stock market index. The peaks for TDC2 including options exercised peaked the 
same year as stock market index. It is no surprise that options are awarded when the stock market is 
high but the timing of exercising options depends on managers’ ability to predict market movements.   
Table 2, Panel A describes the means and standard deviations for the macroeconomic 
variables, interest rate, inflation rate relative to the previous year, and annual exchange rate changes6, 
while Panel B shows the main firm specific accounting variables, Sales and Tobin’s Q. The interest 
rates are the annual average one year Treasury rates. Inflation rates are the year to year changes in the 
level of consumer prices (CPI). The exchange rates are the annual average Euro per Dollar rates after 
1998. Before 1998, the German Mark per Dollar is used. All the macroeconomic factors are obtained 
from DataStream. 
In the Table we can see that the average 1-year T-bill rate is 4.6% and the average annual 
inflation rate is 2.6%. The average annual exchange rate change is -0.006 with a standard deviation of 
0.093. The dollar’s depreciation over the whole period is expected to favor exporting firms. Average 
sales of our firms are 4.3 million dollars and Tobin’s Q is 1.989. The latter is defined as (Market value 
of equity + Book value of debt) / (Book value of equity + Book value of debt). The average CEO age 
is 56 years while the average CEO tenure is about 7 years. These data are not included in the table to 
save space. 
 
(Insert Table 2 here) 
 
                                                 
6 The changes in real US GDP relative to the previous year were tested as well. 
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3. Explaining Compensation with and without Macroeconomic Factors 
In this section we analyze first what performance measures are most strongly linked to CEO 
compensation before turning to analyses of the impact of macroeconomic fluctuations. 
 
3.1 Identifying performance variables and industry effects 
Early studies of executive compensation across firms focus on the relation between CEO 
compensation and measures of firm performance (Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985; Murphy, 1985, 1986; 
Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Abowd, 1990; Leonard, 1990), while other studies analyze whether CEOs 
are rewarded for performance relative to a market or industry benchmark (Antle and Smith, 1986; 
Gibbons and Murphy, 1990; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001; Bebchuk and Grinstein 2005; Garvey 
and Milbourn, 2006). In order to first identify the most important firm-specific factors explaining 
CEO compensation, the compensation data (TOTALCURR, TDC1 and TDC2) is matched with firm 
performance variables. 
 The following pooled regression (1) is estimated for the period 1993-2007 including 17 
industry dummies and 14 year dummies but no macroeconomic variables. Fixed effects and random 
effects models are compared below when macroeconomic factors are included instead of year 
dummies.7 The dependent variable (real compensation) is defined as TOTALCURR, TDC1 and 
TDC2, respectively, since the sensitivities to these compensation measures cannot be expected to be 
the same.  
 
tii
i
ii
i
ii
i
i
tititi
dummiesYeardummiesIndustryvariablesControl
ePerformancLogSalesLogonCompensatiLog
,
14
1
17
1
4
1
,2,10, )()()(





    (1) 
 
The firm’s total (real) sale is used as a proxy for firm size. A number of performance 
variables are tested in equation (1) to find which one(s) explains compensation the best. Tobin’s Q is 
                                                 
7 Equation (1) was also tested in cross‐section for each individual year. The results are not included here for 
reasons of space. 
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adopted as the performance measure in our specifications. Variations in this variable are dominated by 
variations in the market value of equity.  
All variables in the regressions in this study are in logarithms. Therefore, the regression 
coefficients are interpreted as “pay-for-performance elasticities.” One advantage of using the elasticity 
approach is that it produces a better “fit” in terms of marginal effects. The other advantage is that the 
elasticity is relatively invariant to firm size (Gibbons and Murphy, 1992; Murphy 1999). 
Table 3 reports the parameter estimations from three pooled regression models for the period 
1993-2007 by using equation (1). The table shows that firm specific variables including sales revenue, 
CEO age, tenure and firm performance all contribute positively to executive compensation. The cash 
component of compensation is the least sensitive to firm measured by sales and performance 
measured by Tobin’s Q. Compensation including options awarded and exercised (TDC1 and TDC2) 
is more sensitive to these firm level variables. TDC2 is also considerably more sensitive to Tobin’s Q 
than TDC1. CEO age and tenure both contribute positively to cash and total compensation. Industry 
dummies indicate that compensation levels vary substantially across industries.8 The time dummies 
for TDC1 and TDC2 in particular seem to be much larger after 2000 than before. We do not report 
industry and year dummies throughout the paper for reason of brevity.  
Equation (1) was also tested cross-sectionally for each individual year. The results are not 
included here for reasons of space. The compensation elasticities with respect to sales and 
performance were quite stable over time for TDC2 and to a lesser degree for TDC1. The greatest 
variation over time in elasticities was observed for cash compensation. Thus, it seems that the 
composition of compensation varies over time. 
 
(Insert Table 3 here) 
                                                 
8 The sectors in Table 4 are the following with the number of firms in parenthesis: 1=Oil and Gas (22); 2=Food 
Tobacco Products  (28); 3=Paper and Paper Products  (48); 4=Chemical Products  (64); 5=Manufacturing  (35); 
6=Computer  Hardware  &  Software  (66);  7=Electronic  equipment  (35);  8=Transportation  (51);  9=Scientific 
Instruments (38); 10=Communications (10); 11=Electric and Gas Services (58); 12=Durable Goods (8); 13=Retail 
(32); 14=Eating and Drinking Establishments  (20); 15=Financial Services  (38); 16=Entertainment Services  (4); 
17=Health (5); 18=All Others (72). 
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3.2 Macroeconomic influences on compensation and performance 
Macroeconomic influences on compensation can occur through performance variables in 
equation (1) or through other variables influencing compensation. We investigate whether 
macroeconomic variables affect compensation independent of variation in Q and Sales, and we 
analyze macroeconomic influences on Q and Sales. The total macroeconomic influence on 
compensation is calculated as sum of all effects. 
Macroeconomic conditions can be identified by either quantity variables like GDP, GDP 
growth, investments and employment, or by price variables such as interest rates, inflation rates, 
exchange rates and stock market index. Although the former group of variables describes 
macroeconomic conditions, they are typically observed with a substantial lag. As Oxelheim and 
Wihlborg (2008) note, price variables are easily observable signals of underlying macroeconomic 
shocks and developments. A shock would have a certain effect on a group of price variables (i.e. 
interest rate) as well as on quantity variables (i.e. GDP growth). Only the former would be observable 
at the time a shock occurs. Therefore, price-signals can be useful tools for a firm wishing to 
decompose compensation and performance into “intrinsic factors” and macroeconomic factors. 
Another advantage of using price variables like interest rates and exchange rates in the decomposition 
is that they adjust quickly to both domestic and foreign conditions affecting a firm’s performance. 
The macro price variables used in this paper are the 1-year US Treasury interest rate, the 
consumer price index (CPI), the exchange rate (Euro/Dollar). Other dollar-exchange rates are not 
included because they are highly correlated.9 The stock market index is not included because this 
variable does not add explanatory power when interest rate is included.  
The following random effects model is then estimated with firm specific variables, macro-
variables (anticipated and unanticipated), as well as some control variables. 
 
                                                 
9 It seems that most of the variation in most $‐exchange rates are dominated by events originating in the US. 
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(2) 
 
The macro-variables expressed in terms of anticipated and unanticipated changes are 
formulated in the following way. The anticipated interest rate in the next period is assumed to be 
equal to current interest rate. Thus, we define unanticipated interest rate as the interest rate changes 
from year to year.  
 
1 tt irateinterestdAnticipate  
1 ttt iirateinteresttedUnanticipa  
 
The anticipated exchange rate change (euro/$) over the next year is reflected in the current 
one-year interest rate differential (uncovered interest rate parity). Thus, 
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The anticipated inflation over the next year is equal to the inflation last year. In other words, a 
change in the inflation rate from one year to another is considered unanticipated. Thus, 
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Anticipated ∆CPI = cpit-1 – cpit-2 
Unanticipated ∆CPI = (cpit – cpit-1)-(cpit-1 – cpit-2). 
 
All proxies for anticipated and unanticipated changes in macro-variables are subject to 
uncertainty and potential criticism. Nevertheless, we make assumptions about expectations formation 
since incentive effects of compensation sensitivities to these components of macroeconomic 
fluctuations can be quite different. 
Table 4 shows the compensation elasticities with respect to Sales, Tobin’s Q, and the 
macroeconomic variables using equation (2). Age, tenure and industry dummies are included as 
above. The compensation variables are TOTALCURR, TDC1 and TDC2 as above. In Table 5, Model 
1 for TDC1 and TDC2 include all the macroeconomic variables while insignificant variables in Model 
1 have been removed in Model 2.  
We can see that Sales and Tobin’s Q are significant in all the models in Table 4. Looking at 
Model 2 results for macroeconomic variables the conventional measure of total compensation 
awarded (TDC1) depends negatively on both anticipated and unanticipated interest rates, negatively 
on unanticipated inflation and negatively on all three exchange rate factors indicating that an 
appreciation of the dollar is associated with a decline in compensation. The magnitude of several 
coefficients is large. For example, the coefficient of the unanticipated interest rate implies that a one 
percentage point increase in the interest rate is associated with a 7 percent decline in compensation. 
The smallest effects of macro-variables are associated with anticipated inflation (zero) and 
unanticipated exchange rate changes (-0.141). The zero effect of anticipated inflation implies that 
there is no effect of anticipated inflation on real compensation.  
The results for compensation including options exercised each period (TDC2) are different in 
some respects. As noted above the performance (Q) sensitivity has increased relative to results 
without macro variables in Table 3. Furthermore, the effects of unanticipated inflation are 
insignificant. This observation is an indication that managers are not able to exercise option based on 
timing expertise with respect to changes in this macroeconomic variable. We return to this issue 
below. 
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We also add a term (Export sales/Total sales), as well as this ratio interacting with all 
exchange rate variables, to possibly capture firm-specific effects of exchange rate changes. The 
export-sales ratio was obtained for 523 firms out of the total sample of 2,091. The results are not 
presented because neither the export/sales ratio itself, nor the interaction terms were significant. Thus, 
we are not able to identify a higher sensitivity of compensation to exchange rate changes in firms with 
high export dependence. 
We turn now to the impact of macroeconomic factors on the performance measures, Sales and 
Q, which systematically affect compensation. We regress these two performance variables on the set 
of macroeconomic and dummy variables used in equation (2) and Table 4. In addition, Log (Tobin’s 
Q) is an independent variable in the regression for log Sales and vice versa. 
 Table 5 shows that Sales has a small but significant negative effect on Q when controlling for 
macroeconomic factors and Q has a small significant negative effect on Sales.10  
 
(Insert Table 5 here) 
 
 All the macroeconomic variables have a significant effect on both Q and Sales. Anticipated 
and unanticipated interest rates have a negative impact on both variables while inflation has a positive 
impact. Anticipated and unanticipated appreciations of the dollar are associated with negative effects 
on Q and sales. Thus, the macroeconomic effects of interest rate increases and dollar appreciations on 
compensation are negative through the direct channels captured in Table 4 as well as the indirect 
channels captured in Table 5. The effect of increased inflation on TDC1 is negative through the direct 
channel in Table 4 but positive through the impact on Q and Sales in Table 5.  
 
4. The Impact of Macroeconomic Fluctuations on CEO Compensation 
In this section we combine the elasticities estimated in the previous section with actual 
changes in macroeconomic factors each year to “filter out” the share of compensation explained by 
                                                 
10 These results indicate that sales generally are higher than what value maximization would call for. 
15 
 
macroeconomic conditions. First, we ask how much macroeconomic fluctuations contribute to the 
level and variability in compensation. Second, we analyze whether there are substantial differences 
between compensation effects of anticipated and unanticipated macroeconomic fluctuations. Third, 
we ask whether differences between awarded and realized compensation reveal an ability of CEOs to 
exercise options with timing expertise with respect to macroeconomic events. 
 Table 6 shows the total effect of macroeconomic variables while Table 7 shows the effects of 
unanticipated changes. In each of the tables column (1) shows the percent of salary plus bonus 
(TOTALCURR) resulted from macroeconomic factors each year at constant levels of Q and Sales. 
Columns (2) and (3) show the corresponding effects of macroeconomic variables on total 
compensation awarded (TDC1) and total compensation realized (TDC2). Columns (4) and (5) show 
the percent of changes in Q and Sales explained by the same variables. Column (6) presents the sum 
of the effects in columns (1), (4) and (5) using the coefficients in Table 5 as weights. Thus, column 
(6) shows the percentage of current compensation each year explained by macroeconomic factors. 
Columns (7) and (8) show the macroeconomic effects on compensation awarded (TDC1) and realized 
(TDC2), respectively. 
The macroeconomic effects in Table 6, columns (1) through (3) are calculated based on 
deviations from mean levels of the macro variables each year times the appropriate coefficients in 
Tables 4. The procedure for calculating macroeconomic effects on Q and Sales is the same, but the 
coefficients are obtained from Table 5.  
The total macroeconomic impact on compensation in Table 6 varies from year to year and 
differs among the compensation measures. Comparing macroeconomic effects on cash compensation 
(TOTALCURR) in column (6) with total compensation awarded (TDC1) in column (7) and total 
realized compensation (TDC2) in column (8), it can be observed that the time patterns are different. 
The impact on cash compensation varies from a negative 16 percent to a positive 29 percent. The 
corresponding figures for TDC1 (TDC2) are negative 14 (negative 16) percent to positive 30 (44) 
percent. Thus, the variation in realized compensation (TDC2) appears to be the largest. These figures 
do not indicate that managers have exercised options with systematic forecasting expertise. However, 
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there is weak evidence of forecasting expertise in the difference between macroeconomic impact on 
realized compensation over our sample period (11.88 percent) and the macroeconomic impact on 
awarded compensation (8.79 percent). 
Macroeconomic effects of unanticipated changes in macro variables in Table 7 are calculated 
the same way as in Table 6 with the difference that only unanticipated effects of macro variables and 
corresponding coefficients are included. The mean levels of unanticipated changes in macro variables 
are zero.11 
 
(Insert Table 7 here) 
 
The effects of unanticipated macroeconomic fluctuations in Table 7 are large as well. The 
largest negative effect on cash compensation in column (6) is -25 percent in 1994 while the largest 
positive effect is +26 percent in 2001. The corresponding figures for TDC1 are -23 percent in 2000 
and +21 percent in 2001 while for TDC2 they are -15 percent in 2000 and +42 percent in 1998. Thus, 
it seems that realized compensation (TDC2) is subject to smaller extreme negative effects of 
unanticipated macroeconomic fluctuations as well as larger extreme positive effects. Thus, managers 
have been able to avoid exercising options in periods when unanticipated macroeconomic conditions 
are at the most disadvantageous and able to take advantage of the most advantageous conditions. This 
is evidence of occasional forecasting expertise. There is weak evidence in Table 7 that this expertise 
might be systematic in that the unanticipated macroeconomic impact on TDC2 (3.31 percent) is 
greater than the corresponding impact on TDC1 (1.36 percent). 12 
                                                 
11 The effects of the lagged exchange rate levels are neglected since calculation of this effect requires an 
assumption about what the exchange rate would be under “neutral” macroeconomic conditions. 
12 There are substantial differences between the impact of macroeconomic conditions on CEO compensation in 
the US and in Sweden where the variable part of compensation is much lower. According to Oxelheim et al 
(2008), the sensitivity of compensation to macroeconomic factors seems larger in the US than in Sweden for 
the period 2001‐2007. The range for unanticipated macroeconomic effects on total compensation awarded 
ranged from ‐11 to +12 percent in Sweden during the period. The corresponding range for the US during the 
same period was between ‐13 and +21 percent in Table 9. 
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 Table 8 presents the Average Absolute Macro Effects on the different compensation measures 
based on Table 6 for total macro effects and Table 7 for unanticipated macro effects under the 
assumption of symmetry. The Average Absolute Macro Effects shows the average share of 
compensation explained by macroeconomic conditions. Total macroeconomic conditions explain 
approximately equal shares of TDC1 and current compensation in column (1). Macroeconomic 
conditions explain a larger average share of realized compensation (TDC2). Unanticipated macro 
effects explain a relatively large share of awarded compensation (TDC1) during the period 1993-2007 
in column (3). 
(Insert Table 8 here) 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
We analyze macroeconomic influences on CEO compensation in a panel of 2,091 US firms 
for the period 1993-2007 using exchange rate changes, interest rates and inflation rates as indicators 
of macroeconomic fluctuations. The same set of macroeconomic factors was applied for all firms. 
These macroeconomic price variables can be viewed as signals of underlying macroeconomic shocks. 
As such, they are easily observable and useful for decomposing performance and compensation into 
an “intrinsic” component and a macroeconomic component. We estimate the impact of the 
macroeconomic factors on current compensation, total compensation awarded and total realized 
compensation taking into account exercised options.  
 Three channels of macroeconomic influences on compensation are identified. Macroeconomic 
factors affect sales and Q-values, and they affect compensation through other variables that affect 
compensation in a less systematic way than sales and Q. After estimating the elasticities of 
performance variables and compensation to anticipated and unanticipated macroeconomic factors, we 
use the coefficients in combination with macroeconomic developments each year to calculate how 
three different measures of compensation would have developed had macroeconomic influences been 
filtered out. The results indicate that a large share of the annual changes in CEO compensation in the 
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US is explained by macroeconomic factors. The effect on compensation over our sample period 
ranges between 7 percent in current compensation and 12 percent in realized compensation.  
Specifically three research questions have been investigated in this paper. First, we ask how 
much macroeconomic fluctuations contribute to the level and variability of compensation. The 
empirical evidence shows that the macroeconomic impact on cash compensation varies from a 
negative 16 percent to a positive 29 percent. These fluctuations in compensation can be considered the 
result of luck in firms with little flexibility to adjust operations in response to changes in 
macroeconomic conditions. In comparison with a study of awarded compensation in Sweden for the 
period 2001-2007 we find that the sensitivity to macroeconomic conditions is greater in the US than 
in Sweden where the variable share of compensation is much smaller. 
The second research question investigates whether there are substantial differences between 
compensation variations due to anticipated and unanticipated macroeconomic fluctuations. The results 
show that the range for anticipated average absolute effects was 11 to 16 percent, while for 
unanticipated average absolute effects was 9 to 12 percent. The effects from unanticipated 
macroeconomic fluctuations can be considered the result of luck in firms requiring a year or more to 
adjust operations to take advantage of positive macroeconomic effects or reducing the impact of 
negative macroeconomic conditions. The very wide fluctuations in compensation would provide 
appropriate incentives only in the presumably small share of the economy with sufficient flexibility to 
adjust operations very rapidly. In most firms we expect that the sensitivity of compensation to 
macroeconomic fluctuations distort or weaken incentives of management to focus effort and skill 
where they can be applied most effectively.  
Finally, we ask whether differences between awarded and realized compensation reveal an 
ability of CEOs to exercise options with timing expertise with respect to macroeconomic events. 
Based on the regression results, it seems that the managers are able to occasionally time the exercising 
of options with expertise but this expertise may not be systematic. 
 Regulation seems to be emerging in many countries stating that the reward for improved 
performance should not be fully realized unless the improved performance is observed for a period of 
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3-5 years. Increased compensation would be linked to performance surpassing a benchmark for some 
duration. The argument behind such proposals would be that improved performance is likely to be 
caused by other factors than manager skill and effort, i.e. luck, if performance does not exceed a 
benchmark for duration of time.  
 A serious problem associated with the proposals to reward only “sustainable” performance is 
to determine when and how performance above (below) the benchmark should be rewarded 
(penalized) for being the result of skill and effort rather than luck. In the presence of macroeconomic 
fluctuations sustainability of good performance need not be a good indicator of skill and effort as 
opposed to luck for two reasons. First, “lucky” macroeconomic conditions can last for several years 
and, second, the short term impact of macroeconomic conditions could depend on skill and effort in 
firms with a great deal of flexibility. 
 The analysis in this paper can be refined further in future research. We can further detangle 
incentive effects of macroeconomic fluctuations for individual firms with different degrees of 
technological adjustability for operations. Through firm level analysis, we could analyze firm specific 
elasticities of different measures of compensation with respect to macroeconomic variables over time. 
Incentive effects are a subject for future research. 
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Table 1 Annual Compensation Levels 
 
This table displays annual mean, standard deviation for three CEO-compensation levels (Million US Dollar): Cash Compensation(TOTALCURR), Total 
Compensation including Option Awarded (TDC1), and Total Compensation including Option Exercised (TDC2), as well as the index for each variable with 1992 
value=100. The dataset includes 2,158 firms.  
Year # of Firms   Cash Compensation (TOTALCURR) Total Compensation including  Option Granted (TDC1)  
Total Compensation including 
Option Exercised (TDC2)  
  Mean Std Index Mean Std Index Mean std Index
1992 341 1.128 0.754 100.00 2.311 2.238 100.00 2.968 5.920 100.00
1993 1,002 0.992 0.948 87.89 2.060 2.786 89.13 2.246 7.101 75.68
1994 1,307 0.962 0.825 85.23 2.158 2.818 93.38 1.674 2.240 56.40
1995 1,386 1.017 0.877 90.17 2.314 3.369 100.10 2.063 3.344 69.50
1996 1,456 1.118 1.084 99.14 3.145 6.961 136.06 2.635 5.346 88.76
1997 1,534 1.217 1.298 107.92 3.902 7.759 168.82 3.697 9.846 124.56
1998 1,612 1.207 1.232 106.95 4.550 18.328 196.85 4.629 23.452 155.93
1999 1,688 1.299 1.451 115.13 5.079 11.233 219.75 4.227 11.373 142.42
2000 1,709 1.359 1.637 120.47 6.722 21.506 290.82 6.195 23.012 208.70
2001 1,620 1.315 1.784 116.58 6.350 16.411 274.72 4.503 11.835 151.71
2002 1,629 1.391 1.375 123.27 4.919 7.359 212.80 3.798 8.235 127.95
2003 1,686 1.568 1.869 138.98 4.549 6.093 196.80 4.536 9.233 152.83
2004 1,642 1.763 2.008 156.26 5.216 7.193 225.66 5.909 11.498 199.07
2005 1,578 1.898 2.303 168.27 5.554 7.406 240.28 7.169 16.503 241.52
2006 1,498 1.247 1.927 110.56 5.743 7.818 248.45 7.680 15.223 258.75
2007 1,418 1.086 1.737 96.30 5.909 8.126 255.65 7.806 14.085 262.99
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Table 2 Year by Year Descriptive Statistics for the Macroeconomic and 
Microeconomic Factors 
 
Panel A: Macroeconomic Factors 
Year US 1 year rate Exchange rate change US inflation rate 
 Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std.
1993 0.037 0.001 0.006 0.030 0.027 0.018
1994 0.057 0.012 -0.010 0.020 0.026 0.017
1995 0.062 0.005 -0.006 0.032 0.025 0.021
1996 0.058 0.003 0.007 0.021 0.033 0.023
1997 0.061 0.001 0.012 0.029 0.017 0.016
1998 0.055 0.004 -0.062 0.199 0.016 0.013
1999 0.058 0.005 0.013 0.021 0.027 0.026
2000 0.069 0.004 0.005 0.037 0.033 0.035
2001 0.037 0.010 0.004 0.024 0.016 0.042
2002 0.022 0.005 -0.014 0.026 0.023 0.030
2003 0.014 0.001 -0.015 0.030 0.019 0.040
2004 0.022 0.006 -0.006 0.020 0.031 0.040
2005 0.041 0.005 0.012 0.019 0.035 0.065
2006 0.053 0.002 -0.009 0.019 0.025 0.053
2007 0.051 0.004 -0.009 0.017 0.040 0.041
1993-2007 0.046 0.017 -0.006 0.093 0.026 0.005
Panel B: Microeconomic Factors 
Year Sales  Tobin’s Q 
 Mean Std. Mean Std. 
1993 6.767 11.485 1.749 1.087 
1994 4.077 8.670 1.682 0.976 
1995 3.703 9.419 1.871 1.300 
1996 3.757 9.472 1.902 1.242 
1997 3.910 9.732 2.042 1.365 
1998 3.919 9.539 2.194 2.215 
1999 4.127 10.721 2.443 3.596 
2000 4.275 11.912 2.214 2.263 
2001 4.082 10.876 2.047 1.526 
2002 3.926 10.942 1.649 1.058 
2003 4.134 11.511 1.987 1.377 
2004 4.384 12.557 2.018 1.495 
2005 4.687 12.726 1.955 1.436 
2006 5.346 15.437 1.916 1.078 
2007 5.892 16.788 1.871 1.245 
1993-2007 4.350 11.759 1.989 1.735 
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Table 3 Pooled Regression Model with Sector and Time Dummy Variables 
 
This table reports the parameter estimations from three pooled regression models for the period 1993-2007. The 
dependent variables are Log (TOTALCURR), Log (TDC1), and Log (TDC2). The industries are identified in 
footnote 10 in the text. 
 Log (TOTALCURR) Log (TDC1) Log (TDC2) 
Log (Sales) 0.289*** 0.409*** 0.415***
 (71.79) (91.01) (86.26) 
Log (Tobin’s Q) 0.116*** 0.366*** 0.505***
 (8.90) (25.13) (32.29) 
Age 0.067*** 0.047*** 0.055***
 (7.60) (4.83) (5.19) 
Age^2/100 -0.054*** -0.044*** -0.043***
 (-6.88) (-5.02) (-4.56) 
Tenure 0.011*** 0.008*** 0.035***
 (5.44) (3.59) (14.29) 
Tenure^2/100 -0.028*** -0.042*** -0.102***
 (-4.09) (-5.63) (-12.67) 
Constant 2.482*** 2.776*** 1.983*** 
 (9.94) (9.98) (6.64) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,665 18,665 18,665 
R-squared 0.28 0.40 0.40 
1. t-values are in round parentheses. 
2. *, **, *** denotes significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level or better 
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Table 4 Random Effects Model with Firm Specific Factors and Interest Rate, Exchange Rate and Inflation as Macroeconomic Factors 
This table reports the parameter estimations from three random effects models. The dependent variables are Log (TOTALCURR), Log (TDC1), and Log (TDC2). The time 
period is 1993-2007. T-values are in round parentheses. *, **, *** denotes significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level or better. Industry dummies are included in all models. 
 Log  
(TOTALCURR) 
 Log (TDC1)   Log (TDC2) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Log (Sales) 0.278*** 0.398*** 0.398*** 0.419*** 0.419***
 (24.19) (32.59) (32.67) (34.81) (34.83)
Log (Tobin’s Q) 0.185*** 0.368*** 0.368*** 0.652*** 0.651***
 (6.30) (7.62) (7.62) (18.42) (18.46)
Age 0.067*** 0.046** 0.046** 0.052** 0.052**
 (3.41) (2.10) (2.08) (2.35) (2.35)
Age^2/100 -0.057*** -0.044** -0.044** -0.043** -0.043**
 (-3.26) (-2.28) (-2.27) (-2.18) (-2.18)
Tenure 0.010*** 0.004 0.004 0.040*** 0.040***
 (2.98) (0.94) (0.94) (9.85) (9.85)
Tenure^2/100 -0.015 -0.019 -0.019 -0.106*** -0.106***
 (-1.19) (-1.54) (-1.53) (-6.68) (-6.69)
Log (1+Anti. interest rate) -10.622*** -2.949*** -3.364*** -4.818*** -4.924***
 (-18.92) (-4.39) (-5.50) (-5.98) (-6.14)
Log (1+UnAnti. interest rate) -8.745*** -6.485*** -7.002*** -1.979** -2.255***
 (-13.80) (-8.74) (-10.09) (-2.34) (-2.77)
Log (1+Ananti. ΔCPI) -6.966*** -2.254 - 14.765*** 15.677***
 (-4.98) (-1.60) - (8.93) (12.71)
Log (1+UnAnti. ΔCPI) 5.159*** -5.840*** -4.333*** -1.240 -
 (4.77) (-4.12) (-3.95) (-0.90) -
Log (1+Anti. ΔExchange rate) -6.472*** -4.547*** -4.884*** -5.050*** -5.106***
 (-9.20) (-6.53) (-7.08) (-6.47) (-6.50)
Log (1+UnAnti. ΔExchange rate) 0.217*** -0.125*** -0.141*** -0.416*** -0.426***
 (8.99) (-3.82) (-4.54) (-12.85) (-13.57)
Log (Exchange rate (t-1)) 0.277*** -0.591*** -0.579*** -0.771*** -0.763***
 (7.11) (-14.68) (-14.44) (-20.08) (-20.24)
Constant 3.325*** 3.702*** 3.671*** 2.330*** 2.309***
 (6.16) (6.25) (6.19) (3.85) (3.83)
Observations        18,665        18,665         18,665        18,665        18,665
Number of firms          2,091          2,091           2,091          2,091          2,091
R-squared           0.27           0.37            0.37           0.37           0.37
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Table 5 Random Effects Model with Tobin’s Q and Sales as Dependent Variables 
 
This table reports the parameter estimations from two random effects models. The time period is 
1993-2007.  
 Q Equation Sales Equation 
Log (Sales) -0.031*** - 
 (-3.89) - 
Log (Tobin’s Q) - -0.088*** 
 - (-3.18) 
Log (1+Anti. interest rate) -1.432*** -2.107*** 
 (-4.25) (-4.94) 
Log (1+UnAnti. interest rate) -2.629*** -3.326*** 
 (-8.73) (-7.17) 
Log (1+Ananti. ΔCPI) 1.134 10.322*** 
 (1.52) (10.18) 
Log (1+UnAnti. ΔCPI) 4.873*** 0.813 
 (10.10) (1.33) 
Log (1+Anti. Δ Exchange rate) -4.701*** -3.364*** 
 (-15.93) (-7.23) 
Log (1+UnAnti. Δ Exchange rate) -0.041*** -0.403*** 
 (-3.41) (-22.44) 
Log (Exchange rate (t-1)) 0.089*** -0.764*** 
 (5.32) (-24.12) 
Constant 0.582*** 6.947*** 
 (9.06) (78.13) 
Industry dummies                Yes Yes 
Observations             18,665              18,665 
Number of firms               2,091                2,091 
R-squared                  0.16 0.07 
1. t-values are in parentheses.  
2. *, **, *** denotes significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level or better. 
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Table 6 Contribution of the Anticipated plus Unanticipated Macroeconomic Factors to Compensation 
 
This table reports the predicted anticipated and unanticipated symmetric macro effects in different years as well as the whole period 1993-2007 using coefficients in Table 4 
(Models 2 for TDC1 and TDC2). In the column (6), (7) and (8), wq and ws are the coefficients for the variables Log (Tobin’s Q), and Log (Sales) in Table 5.  
Year 
Macro Effects 
 in Current 
Compensation 
given  
Q and Sales 
Macro Effects  
in TDC1 
 given  
Q and Sales 
Macro Effects 
 in TDC2 given  
Q and Sales 
Q  
Equation  
 
Sales  
Equation  
Total Macro 
Effects to  
 the Current 
Compensation 
(1)+wq×(4)+ws×(5) 
Total Macro 
Effects to the 
TDC1 
(1)+wq×(4)+ws×(5) 
Total Macro 
Effects to the 
TDC2 
(1)+wq×(4)+ws×(5) 
 % % % % % % % %
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1993 -12.48 -8.33 -6.25 -11.22 -3.76 -16.30 -14.15 -13.40 
1994 -12.22 -8.76 6.94 -3.85 0.13 -13.26 -10.24 5.42 
1995 -7.84 1.66 6.28 5.61 5.97 -5.18 6.04 12.52 
1996 3.80 7.45 4.94 10.24 4.82 7.54 13.26 12.37 
1997 -0.19 6.44 3.95 6.06 1.05 1.69 9.23 7.17 
1998 -16.65 18.73 24.54 6.63 25.03 -10.18 30.36 43.61 
1999 16.10 3.41 -14.06 10.84 -9.53 17.35 4.31 -15.72 
2000 3.78 -9.19 -11.72 9.30 -9.33 4.64 -8.84 -13.90 
2001 -4.63 14.24 4.91 1.96 10.33 -2.17 18.73 12.46 
2002 3.99 12.97 7.17 -6.62 6.58 3.37 12.70 8.68 
2003 27.20 8.15 0.83 3.95 2.35 28.73 10.56 4.02 
2004 23.89 3.74 11.04 3.67 4.00 25.65 6.64 15.18 
2005 20.51 -0.52 14.49 9.61 4.48 24.01 4.92 21.43 
2006 -0.55 2.73 18.93 5.91 10.38 3.01 8.81 28.17 
2007 -9.91 4.77 11.76 1.66 9.76 -7.64 8.93 18.81 
93-07 5.01 5.16 6.69 4.60 5.01 7.21 8.79 11.88 
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Table 7 Contribution of the Unanticipated Macroeconomic Factors to Compensation 
 
This table reports the predicted unanticipated macro effects in different years as well as the whole period 1993-2007 using coefficients in Table 4 (Models 2 for TDC1 and TDC2). 
In the column (6), (7) and (8), wq and ws are the coefficients for the variables Log (Tobin’s Q), and Log (Sales) in Table 5.  
Year 
Unanticipated 
Macro Effects 
 in Current 
Compensation 
given  
Q and Sales 
UnanticipatedMa
cro Effects  
in TDC1 
given  
Q and Sales 
Unanaticipated
Macro Effects 
 in TDC2 
 given  
Q and Sales 
Q  
Equation  
 
Sales  
Equation  
Total Unanticipated 
Macro Effects to 
Current 
Compensation 
(1)+wq×(4)+ws×(5) 
Total Unanticipated 
Macro Effects to  
TDC1 
(2)+wq×(4)+ws×(5) 
Total Unanticipated 
Macro Effects to   
TDC2 
(3)+wq×(4)+ws×(5) 
 % % % % % % % %
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1993 5.48  4.82  -0.22 0.99 0.44 5.84 5.37 0.48 
1994 -22.06  -10.31  -3.51 -6.92 -6.11 -25.11 -15.26 -10.38 
1995 -5.56  -6.20  3.43 -0.05 2.84 -5.04 -5.20 5.26 
1996 5.52  -4.33  -2.52 1.29 -1.82 5.54 -4.47 -3.17 
1997 -1.73  -5.80  -7.86 -4.29 -8.26 -4.45 -10.47 -15.03 
1998 -15.01  11.02  25.92 0.50 24.71 -10.30 20.09 42.22 
1999 3.65  -9.69  -6.16 1.71 -5.61 3.08 -11.02 -9.10 
2000 0.05  -20.73  -9.57 2.22 -9.39 -1.07 -23.22 -14.75 
2001 22.73  15.47  5.79 5.54 8.62 25.87 20.77 13.72 
2002 5.48  18.30  6.55 -1.71 7.00 6.29 20.13 10.38 
2003 6.16  12.29  9.66 6.12 10.54 9.81 18.51 19.09 
2004 -7.53  4.10  1.95 0.05 1.17 -7.30 4.54 2.72 
2005 -12.90  -9.50  -5.38 -1.45 -6.82 -14.56 -12.52 -10.42 
2006 -12.47  -6.50  -2.69 -4.21 -4.21 -14.42 -9.69 -7.20 
2007 -1.18  1.99  3.91 -0.68 3.74 -0.68 3.06 6.06 
93-07 -1.09  0.60  2.00 0.20 1.88 -0.69 1.36 3.31 
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Table 8 Summary of Results: Average Absolute Total Macro Effects and Unanticipated Macro Effects 
 
 Average Absolute Total Macro Effect  (Table 6) 
Average Absolute Unanticipated Macro Effect 
(Table 7) 
 
Including effects 
through Q and Sales 
% 
At constant Q and 
Sales 
% 
Including effects 
through Q and Sales 
% 
At constant Q and 
Sales 
% 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
TOTALCURR 11.38 10.92 9.29 8.50 
TDC1 11.81 6.80 12.29 9.34 
TDC2 15.52 9.85 11.33 6.34 
 
